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The Constitutionality of State
Residency Requirements for
Attorneys Under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause: The
Attack Continues
Gordon v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 48
N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
I. Introduction
A unanimous decision by the New York Court of Appeals' may
signal the beginning of another round in the court fights involving
both simple2 and durational3 residency requirements for admis-
sion to state bars. In the past, attacks on state residency require-
ments have met with only limited success. These attacks have
been based on the grounds that such residency requirements vio-
late the equal protection, due process, and privileges and immuni-
ties clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as well as the right of
interstate travel.4 Opponents of residency requirements have also
1. Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309,
422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
2. A simple residency provision requires the applicant to be a resident on a spe-
cific date. See, e.g., BAR & BRI, NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIGEST 24 (1978)
(Iowa - date of admission to the bar); id. at 32 (Nebraska - date of applica-
tion for admission to bar).
3. A durational residency provision requires the applicant to be a resident of
the State for a specific period of time. See, e.g., id. at 31 (Montana - six
months prior to application for admission to the bar); note 10 infra.
4. See Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978),
vacated and dismissed on other grounds, 614 F.2d 943 (1980); Wilson v. Wil-
son, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), af'd, 430 U.S. 925 (1977); Tang v. Appellate
Div., 373 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Kline v. Rankin 352 F. Supp. 292
(N.D. Miss. 1972), vacated and remanded for convention of three-judge court,
489 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1974); Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Re-
quirementsfor Admission to the Bar, 71 MICH. L. Rev. 838 (1973); Note, Consti-
tutional Law-Equal Protection and Residence Requirements, 49 N.C. L REv.
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argued that these provisions violate the commerce clause of the
Constitution.5 In addition, such requirements might be subject to
attack under the Sherman Act6 when the requirements are not
mandated by a state court or agency but are promulgated and en-
forced by a separate state bar.7 Nevertheless, none of these theo-
ries have yet successfully provided applicants with a method to
strike down simple or short-term durational residency require-
ments. A majority of the court decisions of this century have up-
held or strongly indicated approval of state residency
requirements of six months or less.8 However, the courts recently
have been equally aggressive in striking down residency require-
ments of one year or more.9 The effect of these court decisions is
that today, although most states maintain some form of residency
requirement, no state has a durational residency requirement
longer than six months residency prior to taking the bar examina-
tion.10 A new theory, however, has been advanced in Gordon v.
753 (1971). For a general review of cases in the areas, see Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d
1163 (1973).
5. See Comment, Commerce Clause Challenge to State Restrictions on Practice
by Out-of-State Attorneys, 72 Nw. U. L REv. 737 (1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
7. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Sherman Act applies
to minimum fee schedules set by state bars); United States v. Oregon State
Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Or. 1974) (same). But cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977) (the state "as sovereign, imposed the restraint [on advertising] as
an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."
Id. at 357.) The Bates court held that although the prohibition of advertising
did not violate the Sherman Act it did violate the first amendment rights of
petitioners. See generally Note, The Sherman Act and Bar Admission Resi-
dence Requirements, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 615 (1975).
8. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), affg per curiam, Martin v. Davis, 187
Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960); Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F.
Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), vacated and dismissed on other grounds, 614 F.2d
943 (4th Cir. 1980); Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972); aff'd
sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Tang v. Appellate Div., 373
F.Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S.906 (1974); Kline v. Rankin, 352 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Miss.
1972), vacated and remanded for convention of three-judge court, 489 F.2d 387
(5th Cir. 1974); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); In re
Robinson, 82 Neb. 172, 117 N.W. 352 (1908); In re Admission to Bar, 61 Neb. 58,
84 N.W. 611 (1900); In re Titus, 213 Va. 289, 191 S.E.2d 798 (1972). But see Potts
v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Ct., 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
9. See Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W. Va. 1972); Lipman v. Van Zant,
329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F.
Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga.
1970). But see Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954).
10. See BAR & BRI, supra note 2. Montana is the only state which requires a six
month residency prior to taking the bar examination, although a few states
require a six month residency period prior to admission. However, Arizona,
California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois (if by exam), Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan (if by exam), Ohio and Pennsylvania have no residency require-
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Committee on Character and Fitness," where the New York Court
of Appeals unanimously held that the state residency requirement
was in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV to the United States Constitution.' 2 Under Gordon, applicants
for admission to the bars in states which still maintain residency
requirements now may have a strong argument for the invalidation
of all residency requirements imposed by the respective state bars.
II. Facts of Gordon
The appellant, Gordon, was a graduate of the University of Vir-
ginia Law School and a member of the bars of Virginia and North
Carolina. While serving as in-house counsel to Western Electric
Company for more than two years in New York City, Gordon took
and passed the New York State Bar Examination. 3 However,
before he received the test results, his company transferred him to
North Carolina. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for
admission to practice law in New York with the Committee on
Character and Fitness of the First Department. 14 However, the
Committee deferred action on the appellant's application because
the New York Bar required the appellant to be an "actual resident
of the State of New York for six months immediately preceding the
ments. In Nebraska, the only requirement is that an applicant must be a resi-
dent at the time of the application. Id. Apparently, we can now add New
York to the list of states without any residency requirements.
11. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
12. This argument was raised in Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F.
Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), vacated and dismissed on other grounds, 614 F.2d
943 (4th Cir. 1980), but that court seemed to confuse the article IV clause with
the privileges and immunities clause found in the fourteenth amendment.
Although the practice of law is not a privilege or immunity of national citizen-
ship under the fourteenth amendment, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1873), it should be a privilege or immunity of citizens in the several
states under article IV. For a recent treatment of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of article IV as it relates to bar residency requirements, see Note,
A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the In-
terstate Privileges and Immunities Clause af Article IV, 92 HARv. L REV. 1461
(1979).
13. 48 N.Y.2d at 269, 397 N.E.2d at 1310, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643. At this time Gordon
had fullfiled the six-month residency requirements under 22 N.Y. CT. R.R.
520.2[a] [3]. This rule required the applicant to be a resident of the State of
New York for six months prior to taking the bar examination. However,
Gordon failed to meet a second residency requirement contained in N.Y. Crv.
PRAc. LAw & R. § 9406, which required a six month residency prior to admis-
sion to the bar.
.14. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(1); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw & R. § 9402; 22 N. Y. CT. R.R. 520.9.
In addition to meeting the two durational requirements, see note 13 supra,
the applicant must, unless waived, pass an examination, possess the requi-
site character and fitness, and swear to support the federal and state constitu-
tions. 48 N.Y.2d at 270 n.5, 397 N.E.2d at 1311 n.5, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643 n.5.
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submission of his application for admission to practice.' u5 Gordon
then petitioned the appellate division for admission without certifi-
cation, but the appellate division denied the petition, upholding
the constitutionality of the requirement. 16 Subsequently, Gordon
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the State of New York which
reversed the lower court's decision.17
1m. ANALYSIS
A. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Article IV of the United States Constitution reads in part: 'The
Citizens 18 of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
munities of Citizens in the several States."' 9 Interpretation of this
clause has not been an easy task for the courts. They have strug-
gled with two distinct and separate questions in applying the privi-
leges and immunities clause to specific cases: (1) Is the asserted
right within the scope of protection of the clause; and, (2) if so,
what test should be used in applying the clause?20
15. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & R. § 9406(2).
16. Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 67 A.D.2d 215, 414 N.Y.S.2d 692
(1979), rev'd, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
17. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
18. The term "citizen" has been defined by the courts to include the term "resi-
dent" so that the courts tend to "find that discrimination on the basis of resi-
dency is sufficient to invoke the clause." Knox, Prospective Applications of
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, 43 Mo. L. REv. 1, 10 (1978). See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656 (1975). However, it should be noted that the term "citizen" excludes cor-
porations which, although being legal persons, are incapable of becoming le-
gal citizens. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548 (1928) (citing Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839)).
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause had its
origin in the Articles of Confederation which stated:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different States in this Union, the
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugi-
tives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, sub-
ject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabit-
ants thereof ....
1 U.S.C. at xxxv (1976). Charles Pinckney, who drafted the privileges and
immunities clause, stated that it was "formed exactly upon the principles of
the 4th article of the present Confederation .... ." 3 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (1911).
20. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases which addressed
these two questions involving the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV. In Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), the
Court found that hunting elk was not within the scope of the clause and, con-
sequently, the Court did not reach the issue of what test should apply. Id. at
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In the past, courts considered only certain "fundamental" or
"natural" rights to be protected by this clause.2 1 In 1823, Bushrod
Washington, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, set forth this
theory in Corfield v. Coryell:22
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times,
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this
Union from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sover-
eign.
2 1
However, the courts have greatly broadened the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause since the Corfield decision so
that, today, the clause is considered to embody a general nondis-
criminatory principle.2 4 In Toomer v. Witsell,25 the Court summa-
rized this principle by saying that the privileges and immunities
388. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), one's employment was found to
be within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 529.
The Court then articulated a series of tests, the application of which resulted
in a finding that the Alaska resident preferential hiring practice was uncon-
stitutional. See id. at 534.
21. There has been much scholastic and legal debate over the use of the term
"fundamental" to describe rights protected under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. The most recent case to use the term "fundamental" was Bald-
win v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), where the Court
held that the right to hunt elk was not "fundamental" and, therefore, not pro-
tected under the privileges and immunities clause. However, Justice Bren-
nan, dissenting, said, "I think the time has come to confirm explicitly that
which has been implicit in our modem privileges and immunities decisions,
namely that an inquiry into whether a given right is "fundamental" has no
place in our analysis of whether a State's discrimination against nonresidents
... violates the Clause." Id. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White,
J. & Marshall, J.). The majority itself explicitly stated that their use of the
term "fundamental" was in a "modern" rather than a "natural rights" sense.
436 U.S. at 387.
22. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
23. Id. at 551.
24. The nondiscriminatory theory of the privileges and immunities clause was
first set forth in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), where the Court
stated:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alien-
age in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against
them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other
States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other states the
same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acqui-
sition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness;
and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their
laws.
Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
25. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B en-joy. ' 26 Thus, fundamental rights are no longer the only rights pro-
tected under the privileges and immunities clause. Other rights
falling within this clause include those granted by a state to its citi-
zens, such as the right of equal access on equal terms for commer-
cial hunting or fishing of state wildlife, 27 and the right to medical
services available in the state,2 8 even when it is recognized that the
state may properly restrict, control or allow the exercise of such
rights. 29
Although considerably broadened by Toomer, the principle of
nondiscrimination under the privileges and immunities clause is
not absolute. For example, a citizen of one state may be required
to become a resident in another state before demanding the right
to vote30 or to run for an elective office in that state.31 Similarly,
privileges granted by the state which do not greatly or directly af-
fect others outside of the state are not within the scope of the
clause. "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities'
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the
State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally."32 Thus,
a state may charge nonresidents much higher fees for the privilege
of hunting elk than it charges its own residents because hunting is
not vital to our nation as a single entity.33 On the other hand, a
state may not charge nonresidents fees higher than those charged
residents for the privilege of commercial shrimp fishing34 because
26. Id. at 395. For a discussion of the relationship between the term "citizen" and
the term "resident," see note 18 supra.
27. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415
(1952).
28. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972).
29. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 393.
30. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd.,
360 U.S. 45 (1958). "Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record
are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consid-
eration in determining the qualifications of-voters." Id. at 51.
31. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Corm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). In
dicta, the Baldwin Court said:
No one would suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause re-
quires a State to open its polls to a person who declines to assert that
the State is the only one where he claims the right to vote. The same
is true as to qualifications for an elective office of the State.
Id. at 383.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 388. In Baldwin, the Court upheld a Montana practice of charging non-
residents $225 for a licence to hunt elk while charging resident only $9. How-
ever, elk hunting was not a commercial activity because of limitations on the
number of elks that could be legally taken, and because the cost of hunting
elk greatly exceeded the probable return. Id.
34. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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the right to earn a living is one of those privileges which bear upon
the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.3 5 Consequently, the
right to earn a living is within the scope of the privileges and im-
munities clause.
The second major question under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause is related to the development of appropriate criteria for
evaluating whether differential treatment of nonresidents by the
states is permitted. Through several court decisions, a three-tiered
test has emerged as a backbone of the judicial reasoning
processes: (1) Does the state treat residents and nonresidents
with substantial equality;36 if not, (2) do nonresidents "constitute a
peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed;' 37 and, if
they do, (3) is the method of regulation adopted closely tailored or
substantially related to the evil presented.38
The privileges and immunities clause does not demand abso-
lute equality. Rather, it looks to the degree of discrimination delin-
eated by the state regulation in order to determine whether there
is a potential violation of the clause.3 9 Regulations which cause
only a very slight or incidental degree of discrimination are not un-
constitutional,4 o while regulations which fail to treat residents and
35. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (struck down a state law which
granted all Alaskans a flat employment preference for all jobs resulting from
oil and gas leases); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (struck down a state
law which required a higher licensing fee for nonresidents); Ward v. Mary-
land, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (struck down a state law which discrimina-
torily taxed out-of-state produce vendors).
In Toomer, the Court said "it was long ago decided that one of the privi-
leges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing busi-
ness in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that
State." 334 U.S. at 396.
36. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1974); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396 (1948).
37. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
398 (1948).
38. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527, 528 (1978); Gordon v. Committe on Char-
acter & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645. One
commentator, citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1974), has stated
that the standard is one of reasonableness. Knox, supra note 18, at 16-22. In
Austin, the Court used a two pronged analysis: whether there was a reason-
ably fair distribution of burdens and whether there was any intentional dis-
crimination. 420 U.S. at 664. However, this two-pronged analysis goes to the
question of whether there was any discrimination in the first place; not to
whether that discrimination is prohibited under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause.
39. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 663-65 (1974), where the Court
reviewed the cases concerning the amount of discrimination which is re-
quired before a potential violation arises.
40. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1919). In Shaffer, a tax case construing the
privileges and immunities clause, the Court said, "The difference, however, is
only such as arises naturally from the extent of the jurisdiction of the State in
[Vol. 60:200
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nonresidents with substantial equality are potentially unconstitu-
tional, and must be subjected to the second and third tiers of the
test.4 1 The second tier of the test probes the reasoning behind the
challenged regulation: Was the regulation intended to address a
problem presented to the state by nonresidents but not by resi-
dents,42 or was the state simply attempting to secure some advan-
tage for its residents?43 If the mere fact of nonresidency was the
only substantial reason for the discrimination, the state regulation
violates the privileges and immunities clause.44 However, if there
are other substantial reasons for the discriminatory treatment of
nonresidents, the constitutionality of the discrimination will be de-
termined under the third tier of the test, which examines the rela-
tionship of the statute or regulation to the evil which it
addresses. 45 If the statute or regulation is closely tailored to meet
the evil presented by nonresidents, the discriminatory treatment
is constitutional.4 6
B. The Tests Applied
In Gordon, the New York Court of Appeals held that the prac-
tice of law was within the scope of the protection granted by the
the two classes of cases, and cannot be regarded as an unfriendly or unrea-
sonable discrimination." Id. at 57. But see Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60 (1919); Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1919).
41. Although the Supreme Court apparently has never applied all three tiers of
this test together in the same case, each stage of the test has been applied in
distinct cases. For application of the first tier, see Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656 (1974). In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) and in Toomer v.
Witseil, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the Court did not directly address the first tier of
the test but did apply the final two tiers. Nevertheless, in both of these cases,
substantial equality would not have been found In Hicklin, Alaska gave
preferential treatment to its residents in relation to employment rights; in
Toomer, South Carolina charged nonresidents much higher fees for the privi-
lege of commercial fishing than it charged residents.
42. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
43. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 81 (1919).
44. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). "It does bar discrimination against
citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimi-
nation beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States." Id.
45. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527 (1978). In Hicklin the Court stated:
Moreover, even if the State's showing is accepted as sufficient to indi-
cate that nonresidents were 'a peculiar source of evil,' Toomer and
Mullaney compel the conclusion that Alaska Hire nevertheless fails
to pass constitutional muster. For the discrimination the Act works
against nonresidents does not bear a substantial relationship to the
particular 'evil' they are said to present.
Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that both "substantial relation-
ship" and "closely tailored" are used to denote the same concept. See id. at
527, 528.
46. Id. at 528.
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
privileges and immunities clause.47 Based upon this holding, the
court applied the three-tiered test to the New York regulations
concerning attorney residency.
First, the court found that the residency requirement worked
invidious discrimination against nonresidents in that an out-of-
state attorney who already maintained a practice in another state
could not become a member of the New York Bar without moving
to New York and forfeiting his right to engage in his chosen occu-
pation for six months, whereas an in-state attorney could practice
law immediately.4 8 The finding of invidious discrimination clearly
fails to meet the substantial equality requirement of the first tier of
the test because invidious discrimination denotes substantial ine-
quality.
After determining that the residency requirement failed to pass
the first tier of the test, the Gordon court did not address the sec-
ond tier of the test beyond simply assuming that nonresidents did
"indeed present a problem with which the State may legitimately
address. ' 49 This assumption allowed the court to focus on the
third stage of this test, and to thoroughly scrutinize the relation-
ship between the special problems which non-residents allegedly
presented and the relief the residency requirement purportedly
provided.50
The first such problem considered by the Gordon court was the
bar admission authorities' admittedly legitimate interest in observ-
ing and evaluating an out-of-state applicant's character.5 ' Because
47. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644-45 (1979). The
court stated:
It is now beyond dispute that the practice of law, despite its histori-
cal antecedents as a learned profession somehow above that of the
common trades, is but a species of those commercial activities within
the ambit of the clause .... From the standpoint of both the public
and the legal profession itself, the practice of law is analogous to any
other occupation in which an independent agent acts on behalf of a
principal.
Id.
48. Id. at 272-73, 397 N.E.2d at 1312-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645. The court also noted
the penalizing effect that this residency requirement would have on attor-
neys who specialize in a particular area in a multistate practice (usually as
one specializes topically, one must also expand geographically to maintain a
level of efficiency), and on attorneys who are employed by large corporations
(more than 10% of the bar). Id.
49. Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
50. In relation to the third tier of the test, the State did not list any reasons why
the admission to the practice of the law in New York should be dependent on
residency. Nevertheless, the court considered some of the standard justifica-
tions for residency requirements. Id. at 273-74, 297 N.E.2d at 1313, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 645-46. For a list of potential justifications, see note 74 infra.
51. 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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applicants were personally interviewed, were available to the
Committee on Character and Fitness, and, in some cases, were
permitted to furnish affidavits as to their character,5 2 the court
found that this justification "serve[d] only administrative conven-
ience . . .- 53 and, thus, was "not closely tailored to serve a legiti-
mate State interest."5 4
A second special problem presented by nonresident attorneys
involved the ability of New York courts to properly supervise and
discipline their inappropriate conduct. The Gordon court found
that there were solutions to this problem that were less restrictive
than the blanket banning of nonresidents from admission to the
New York Bar.55 For example, the state could require "nonresi-
dent attorneys to appoint an agent for the service of process within
the State"'5 6 so that the state could maintain jurisdiction over its
attorneys at all times. Moreover, other forms of discipline such as
contempt, suspension or revocation of license, and malpractice ac-
tions could be applied as easily to nonresidents as to residents.57
Consequently, the general failure of the proposed justifications to
reach the level of legitimacy required to support residency regula-
tions, and the availability of less restrictive alternatives that would
meet the special problems caused by nonresidents, caused the
court to conclude that New York's six month residency require-
ment was unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV.5 8
C. Analysis of the Application
1. Is The Legal Profession Within the Ambit of the Clause?
Before Gordon, the legal profession was not considered to be
within the ambit of the privileges and immunities clause.5 9 Conse-
quently, attorneys or would-be attorneys were effectively pre-
vented from using the clause to challenge residency requirements.
It had been settled for some time that the right to pursue one's
chosen occupation was protected against state protectionist activi-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id., 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
56. Id. Cf. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1934) (state may provide that
service of process upon an agent or clerk constitutes service upon the princi-
pal or the employer); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (state may declare
that service of process upon the registrar constitutes service upon a nonresi-
dent who uses the state's highways). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1488.
57. 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
58. Id. at 274-75, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
59. See Note, supra note 12, at 1468-70.
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ties by the privileges and immunities clause of article TV. 60 Never-
theless, because the practice of law had been traditionally viewed
as being above, or at least somehow different from, the "ordinary
trades," it was not subject to the settled right formulated for "ordi-
nary trades."' 61 However, this concept has been severely eroded in
recent years. The perceived gap between the professions and the
common trades has narrowed considerably because of the in-
creased recognition given by the courts to the commercial aspects
of modern law practice,62 and because of the large increase in the
number of occupations which now are either deemed to be profes-
sions or are otherwise subject to extensive state regulations. 63
Thus, differences between the practice of law and other trades now
appear to be a matter of degree rather than of substance.
The Supreme Court in recent years has recognized this trend
toward equalizing the legal status of professions and common
trades by severely restricting the states' power to regulate the
practice of law. In striking down a state prohibition against adver-
tising by lawyers, the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona64
stated: "Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade
has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the ad-
vertising restraint has crumbled. ' 65 If lawyers are no longer above
other trades, 66 the argument naturally seems to follow that the le-
gal profession should have the same protection under the privi-
60. See note 35 & accompanying text supra.
61. See Note, supra note 12, at 1468-70.
62. See notes 64-66 & acompanying text infra.
63. See Gelhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHL L REV. 6, 10-13
(1976); Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for De-
nial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46, 46-50 (1972).
64. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
65. Id. at 371-72. The Court, however, did not say that there could never be any
distinctions between professions and other trades. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
66. But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 772 (1975). In Goldfarb the
Supreme Court held that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a local bar
association and enforced by the state bar violated the Sherman Act when it
resulted in a rigid price floor for legal services. However, the Court stated:
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically apply to
the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas.
The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as
a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differ-
ently.
Id. at 778 n.17. Apparently, the Court meant that although the profession may
be a trade for some purposes of the Sherman Act, it may be viewed as some-
how different from a trade in other situations because of its public service
aspect. Interpreted in this manner, this Goldfarb footnote may become a fu-
ture pressure point in litigation of state residency requirements under the
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leges and immunities clause that other trades enjoy.67
Extending the coverage of the privileges and immunities clause
to the legal profession will not prohibit states from regulating the
profession. Today, many of the common trades which have been
protected by the clause for years are highly regulated.68 The main
effect of extending protection to the legal profession will be to
eliminate residency requirements which lack constitutionally
sound justifications.
2. State Residency Requirements and Substantial Equality
Residency requirements, including simple residency require-
ments, have formed a significant barrier to lawyers seeking admis-
sion to practice in other states. The concept that a lawyer should
have to move his place of residence, even for a day, before being
permitted to practice his chosen profession in another state not
only contravenes the policy of unity undergirding the privileges
and immunities clause,6 9 but also may tend to discourage many
lawyers from practicing law in neighboring states or in states
where their local clients have interests. For many lawyers who
may otherwise be willing to take the required tests, to appear for
private interviews and to provide material on their character and
privileges and immunities clause. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
Gordon court did not even address the "public service" problem.
What the Supreme Court in Goldfarb meant by its term "public service
aspect" and why that separates the practice of law from other service trades
is presently unclear. The Supreme Court has also stated:
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility
and influence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital
right of access to the courts.... Yet, they are not officials of govern-
ment by virtue of being lawyers. Nor does the status of holding a
license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political
process as to make him a formulator of government policy.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (discrimination based on citizenship
was unconstitutional where it excluded aliens from the practice of law). If
there are no governmental reasons for regarding lawyers differently from
other trades, i.e., if the argument that lawyers should be treated differently
because they are officers of the court is no longer valid, then the public serv-
ice aspect of the legal profession appears to be little different from the public
service aspect of banking or any other business which provides services to
the public.
67. The protection granted by the privileges and immunities clause includes the
right to be employed in another state without discriminatory restrictions. In
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the Court stated: "Ward thus recog-
nized that a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to an-
other State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory restrictions
in favor of state residents imposed by the other State." Id. at 525 (italics sup-
plied) (referring to Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870)).
68. See note 63 & accompanying text supra.
69. See note 19 supra.
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fitness, the residency requirement of a state may be the hurdle
over which they are unwilling to jump.
The concept of substantially equal is and should be a high stan-
dard.70 This high standard should cause almost all discriminations
against nonresidents which involve rights under the protection of
the clause to fall within the ambit of the clause. Thus, every state
enactment which requires a nonresident to change his place of res-
idence'in order to secure a right protected under the privileges and
immunities clause should be subject to scrutiny by the courts to
determine whether the requirement is supported by strong rea-
sons commensurate with the rights which are being denied.
3. Special Problems Presented by Nonresident Attorneys
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state has legiti-
mate interests in assuring the competency and good character of
its bar.7 1 Character screening prior to admission to the bar72 and
disciplinary action after admission 73 are two methods often used to
achieve these legitimate state goals.7 4 Because nonresidents will
70. The only case apparently meeting this standard was the Oklahoma tax case
of Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1919). In Shaffer, the Court held that the
discrimination was only to be found in "theoretical distinctions... [and not
in] . . . the practical effect and operation of the respective taxes as levied
.... " Id. at 56. The Court, in a companion case, held that allowing residents
a tax exemption of from $1000 to $2000 or more but denying nonresidents a
similar exemption did not meet the substantial equality requirement. Travis
v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1919). In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1947), the Court found that a South Carolina licensing statute "plainly and
frandy discriminates against non-residents." Id. at 396.
71. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1972); Law Students Research Council v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 239 (1956); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318-20 (1866).
72. Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at
1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
73. Id., 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
74. The fact that nonresidents are less likely to know state laws and understand
local customs, and the fact that nonresidents may not be subject to the type
of character study determined to be necessary by state bars are the most
commonly cited justifications for residency requirements. See, e.g., Brown v.
Supreme Ct., 359 F. Supp. 549, 556-62 (E.D. Va.), affid mem., 414 U.S. 1034
(1973); Tang v. Appellate Div., 373 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 402 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster v. Wof-
ford, 321 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Another possible justification for
residency requirements is that residency gives the lawyer "a deeper sense of
community responsibility, and ... affords him an opportunity to give a
strong indication of his sincere intent to become a permanent resident to the
community." Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar:
A Compromise Proposalfor Change, 56 Comi;ELL L. REv. 831, 837 (1971). Fur-
thermore, it has been asserted that a residency requirement "(1) facilitates
attorney-client communication, (2) gives the public confidence in the stabil-
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probably be more geographically distant, the state, in its attempt
to determine character and competency, may be forced to deal
with nonresidents differently than it deals with residents. More-
over, since nonresidents may not be subject to the state's service
of process for disciplinary actions, the state may need to require
nonresidents to appoint an agent for service of process within the
state.7 5 These problems illustrate that nonresidents do present a
special problem to the state and that in order to accomplish its ad-
mittedly legitimate goals, a state will need to tailor special regula-
tions to meet these sources of potential evil.7 6 As stated in
Toomer, there are other reasons for the discrimination beyond the
"mere fact that they are citizens of other States. '77
4. Closely Tailoring Residency Requirements to the Evil
Presented
In order to determine whether the "closely tailored" require-
ment is met, each possible justification must be considered. The
Gordon court considered and properly rejected the rationale of
character evaluation. 78 An out-of-state applicant's character may
be checked in the same way as an in-state applicant's character -
through interviews and affidavits.7 9 The residency requirement is
over-inclusive in that many out-of-state applicants in areas border-
ing the state may be as well-known within the state as are some in-
state applicants and may be available for the same type of charac-
ter assessment. Furthermore, it is under-inclusive in that in-state
applicants who live some distance from the general situs of the
main congregation of the bar may be less available for character
study than some out-of-state applicants.
Most of the other possible justifications for state residency re-
quirements 80 would also fail for the reason that they are both over-
and under-inclusive.8 1 Facilitating attorney-client communica-
ity of the local bar, (3) expedites the conduct of trials and local judicial pro-
ceedings, (4) aids in the apprehension of lawyers suspected of malpractice, or
(5) eases the administration of bar admission procedures such as registra-
tion, testing, investigation, and interviewing." Id. at 839.
75. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
76. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
77. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 396.
78. 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
79. Id.
80. See note 74 supra.
81. The Court used this analysis in its decision in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978), where it stated:
For the discrimination the Act works against nonresidents does not
bear a substantial relationship to the particular 'evil' they are said to
present. Alaska Hire simply grants all Alaskans, regardless of their
employment status, education, or training, a flat employment prefer-
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tions, increasing the stability of the local bar, showing a sincere
intent to become a permanent resident of the community, and un-
derstanding the local laws are justifications directed toward the
evil allegedly presented by the fact that nonresident attorneys do
not live in the local community. However, a state residency re-
quirement is over-inclusive because it excludes nonresident attor-
neys who may live in a metropolitan area that encompasses more
than one state. It is under-inclusive because it does not address
the problems presented by out-state attorneys. For example, the
knowledge of local law is not substantially related to residency be-
cause some nonresident attorneys may be very familiar with the
local law, while other in-state attorneys may be quite inept in local
law controversies. Furthermore, a bar examination, a less restric-
tive alternative to residency requirements, would arguably be
more closely tailored to this aspect of the evil presented by nonres-
ident attorneys.
The only justification which clearly is not over-inclusive or
under-inclusive is the argument relating to the amenability to the
supervision of state courts for discipline. Although the state courts
have jurisdiction over all persons residing in the state, they do not
automatically have jurisdiction over those residing outside of the
state.82 Consequently, state boundaries do form a line between
those presenting the amenability problem and those who do not.
However, the amenability justification is particularly unconvincing
in light of settled doctrines which provide less restrictive alterna-
tives. First, although nonresident attorneys are not automatically
subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts, they may be brought
into the jurisdiction of the courts if they maintain minimum con-
tacts.83 Arguably, any attorney who practiced in the state would
have the required minimum contacts. Moreover, the state may re-
quire nonresident attorneys to appoint agents within the state for
the service of process. 84 This should meet the amenability prob-
ence for all jobs covered by the Act. A highly skilled and educated
resident who has never been unemployed is entitled to precisely the
same preferential treatment as the unskilled, habitually unemployed
Arctic Eskimo enrolled in a job-training program .... Even if a stat-
ute granting an employment preference to unemployed residents or
to residents enrolled in job-training programs might be permissible,
Alaska Hire's across-the-board grant of a job preference to all Alas-
kan residents clearly is not."
Id. at 527-28.
82. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
83. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Rush
v. Savachuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
84. See note 56 supra.
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lem presented by out-of-state attorneys with a minimum of incon-
venience to the state.
Furthermore, an assertion of inconvenience as a separate justi-
fication for a residency requirement rhight be subject to attack
under another constitutional principle. In Sosna v. Iowa,85 a case
involving an attack on a residency requirement under the equal
protection and due process clauses, the Supreme Court stated that
justifications based on administrative convenience were insuffi-
cient to justify residency requirements in the face of constitutional
attacks.8 6 In light of Sosna, there appears to be no cogent reason
to conclude that any conceivable administrative inconvenience
caused by requiring nonresident attorney's to appoint agents
within the state would justify a residency requirement.
In summary, it appears that none of the justifications for resi-
dency requirements would withstand analysis based on whether
the requirements were closely tailored to the evil presented by
nonresidents. Unless more convincing justifications are offered in
the future, even simple residency requirements should be rejected
under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
The scope of Gordon might be viewed narrowly as being re-
stricted to the facts of the case, i.e., that only a six month dura-
tional residency requirement was declared unconstitutional.
87
Even under this narrow analysis the court has pushed farther than
85. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
86. Id. at 406. Sosna involved a person who sought a divorce in Iowa one month
after she had taken up residence in the state. The Court upheld the require-
ment that a person must reside in the state for one year before seeking a
divorce in state court in the face of a challenge under the equal protection
and due process clauses. The rational for the residency requirement was
largely based on protecting the sovereignty of the state under the full faith
and credit clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. In referring to several prior cases
where residency requirements were struck down as unconstitutional, the
Court said: "What those cases had in common was that the durational resi-
dency requirements they struck down were justified on the basis of budget-
ary or recordkeeping considerations which were held insufficient to outweigh
the constitutional claims of the individuals." 419 U.S. at 406. Gordon involved
an alleged violation of the privileges and immunities clause rather than at-
tacks based on the equal protection clause or the constitutional right to travel
present in previous cases attacking residency requirements. See, e.g., Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
87. In Golden v. State Board of Law Examiners, 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), the
court stated: "The New York Court of Appeals, however, recently held that
the privileges and immunities clause prevents a state from imposing dura-
tional residency requirements on applicants for admission to the bar." Id. at
945 (emphasis added).
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most other courts have been willing to go in striking down the resi-
dency requirement.88 However, the actual conclusion of the
Gordon court suggests the broader interpretation and analysis
given it in this note to the effect that even simple residency re-
quirements are unconstitutional. The court stated:
By denying otherwise qualified applicants their right to practice their
chosen occupation based solely on their state of residence, CPLR 9406
(subd. 2) works an unconstitutional discrimination against nonresidents.
Any interest the State may have in regulating nonresident attorneys is ill
served by the onerous burden imposed by the rule. A number of less dras-
tic, and constitutionally permissible, alternatives are readily available to
protect the interest of the State in supervising those who practice in its
courts.
8 9
The decision of the Gordon court striking down New York's
residency requirements under the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV is clearly supported by analysis. The fact that
ten states have no residency requirements 90 is an additional indi-
cation that the justifications for any residency requirement are not
persuasive. Even ff nonresident attorneys do present certain evils,
residency requirements are not closely tailored to meet those
evils. Appropriately, the decision of the Gordon court has already
made its way into a federal circuit court's opinion. In Golden v.
State Board of Law Examiners,91 a case dismissed because the
residency issue had become moot, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit favorably cited Gordon.92
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the precise
question placed before the Gordon court, in recent years it has
been receptive to arguments based upon the privileges and immu-
nities clause. 93 Moreover, the Court's holdings in In re Griffiths94
and in Bates9 5 have provided valuable support for the argument
that law should no longer be treated as a quasi-public profession
exempt from the privileges and immunities protection,96 but
should be subject to the same constitutional tests under that
88. The only other case which held a six month residency requirement to be un-
constitutional was Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Ct., 332 F. Supp.
1392 (D. Hawaii 1971). See notes 4-11 & accompanying text supra.
89. 48 N.Y.2d at 274-75, 397 N.E.2d 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646 (emphasis added).
90. See note 10 supra.
91. 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 945.
93. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1974).
94. 413 U.S. 717 (1972).
95. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
96. For this early view, see Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the Several States, 1 MICH. L. REV. 286, 292-308 (1902). For the proposition
that law should no longer be treated differently than other occupations for
residency requirement purposes, see Note, supra note 12, at 1470-79.
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clause as would be any other occupation. Concededly, the interest
of a state in regulating the legal profession is considerably higher
than its interest in regulating certain other occupations. However,
that is an entirely separate question from whether the practice of
law is within the protections of the privileges and immunities
clause. Placing the practice of law within the privileges and immu-
nities clause is a giant step toward providing the legal profession
with the full constitutional guarantees accorded to other occupa-
tions while still enabling the state to maintain closely tailored reg-
ulations to protect societal interests.
Tim Binder '81

